Shank ‘em NC

I negate. As to negate means to deny the truth of, my burden for the round is to disprove the resolution as a statement.

Act One is Relativism [0:37]

All ethics in a society are relativistic; there is never one static conception of ethics.

Spirkin[[1]](#footnote-1),

*The human being and the group.* **The problem of man cannot be solved** scientifically **without** a clear statement of **the relationship between man and society,** as seen in the primary collectivity—the family, the play or instruction group, the production team and other types of formal or informal collectivity. In the family the individual abandons some of his specific features to become a member of the whole. The life of the family is related to the division of labour according to sex and age, the carrying on of husbandry, mutual assistance in everyday life, the intimate life of man and wife, the perpetuation of the race, the upbringing of the children and also various moral, legal and psychological relationships. The family is a crucial instrument for the development of personality. It is here that the child first becomes involved in social life, absorbs its values and standards of behaviour, its ways of thought, language and certain value orientations. It is this primary group that bears the major responsibility to society. Its first duty is to the social group, to society and humanity. Through the group the child, as he grows older, enters society. Hence the decisive role of the group. The influence of one person on another is as a rule extremely limited; the collectivity as a whole is the main educational force. Here the psychological factors are very important. It is essential that a person should feel himself part of a group at his own wish, and that the group should voluntarily accept him, take in his personality. Everybody performs certain functions in a group. Take, for example, the production team. Here people are joined together by other interests as well as those of production; they exchange certain political, moral, aesthetic, scientific and other values. A group generates public opinion, it sharpens and polishes the mind and shapes the character and will. Through the group a person rises to the level of a personality, a conscious subject of historical creativity. The group is the first shaper of the personality, and the group itself is shaped by society. *The unity of man and society.* **A person's whole intellectual make-up bears the clear imprint of the life of society as a whole.** All his practical activities are individual expressions of the historically formed social practice of humanity. The implements that he uses have in their form a function evolved by a society which predetermines the ways of using them. When tackling any job, we all have to take into account what has already been achieved before us. The wealth and complexity of the individual's social content are conditioned by the diversity of his links with the social whole, the degree to which the various spheres of the life of society have been assimilated and refracted in his consciousness and activity. This is why the level of individual development is an indicator of the level of development of society, and vice versa. But **the individual** does not dissolve into society. He **retains his** unique and independent **individuality and makes his contribution to the social whole**: **just as society itself shapes human beings, so human beings shape society.** The individual is a link in the chain of the generations. **His affairs are regulated** not only by himself, but also **by the social standards**, by the collective reason or mind. The true token of individuality is the degree to which a certain individual in certain specific historical conditions has absorbed the essence of the society in which he lives. Consider, for instance, the following historical fact. Who or what would Napoleon Bonaparte have been if there had been no French Revolution? It is difficult or perhaps even impossible to reply to this question. But one thing is quite clear—he would never have become a great general and certainly not an emperor. He himself was well aware of his debt and in his declining years said, "My son cannot replace me. I could not replace myself. I am the creature of circumstances."[[1]](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/ch05-s04.html" \l "FTN.AEN1216) It has long been acknowledged that great epochs give birth to great men. What tribunes of the people were lifted by the tide of events of the French Revolution— Mirabeau, Marat, Robespierre, Danton. What young, some times even youthful talents that had remained dormant among the people were raised to the heights of revolutionary, military, and organisational activity by the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is sometimes said that society carries the individual as a river carries a boat. This is a pleasant simile, but not exact. An individual does not float with the river; he is the turbulently flowing river itself. The events of social life do not come about by themselves; they are made. The great and small paths of the laws of history are blazed by human effort and often at the expense of human blood. The laws of history are not charted in advance by superhuman forces; they are made by people, who then submit to their authority as something that is above the individual. The key to the mysteries of human nature is to be found in society. Society is the human being in his social relations, and every human being is an individual embodiment of social relations, a product not only of the existing social system but of all world history. He absorbs what has been accumulated by the centuries and passed on through traditions. Modern man carries within himself all the ages of history and all his own individual ages as well. His personality is a concentration of various strata of culture. He is influenced not only by modern mass media, but also by the writings of all times and every nation. He is the living memory of history, the focus of all the wealth of knowledge, abilities, skills, and wisdom that have been amassed through the ages. Man is a kind of super-dense living atom in the system of social reality. He is a concentration of the actively creative principle in this system. Through myriads of visible and invisible impulses the fruit of people's creative thought in the past continues to nourish him and, through him, contemporary culture. Sometimes the relation between man and society is interpreted in such a way that the latter seems to be something that goes on around a person, something in which he is immersed. But this is a fundamentally wrong approach. Society does, of course, exist outside the individual as a kind of social environment in the form of a historically shaped system of relations with rich material and spiritual culture that is independent of his will and consciousness. The individual floats in this environment all his life. But society also exists in the individual himself and could not exist at all, apart from the real activity of its members. History in itself does nothing. Society possesses no wealth whatever. It fights no battles. It grows no grain. It produces no tools for making things or weapons for destroying them. It is not society as such but man who does all this, who possesses it, who creates everything and fights for everything**. Society is not some impersonal being that uses the individual as a means of achieving its aims.** All world history is nothing but the daily activity of individuals pursuing their aims. Here we are talking not about the actions of individuals who are isolated and concerned only with themselves, but about the actions of the masses, the deeds of historical personalities and peoples. **An individual** developing within the framework of a social system **has** both **a** certain **dependence on** the whole system of **social standards** and an autonomythat is an absolutely necessary precondition for the life and development of the system. The measure of this personal autonomy is historically conditioned and depends on the character of the social system itself. Exceptional rigidity in a social system (fascism, for example) makes it impossible or extremely difficult for individual innovations in the form of creative activity in various spheres of life to take place, and this inevitably leads to stagnation. *The relationships between the individual and society in history.* To return once again to the simile of the river. The history of humankind is like a great river bearing its waters into the ocean of the past. What is past in life does not become something that has never been. No matter how far we go from the past, it still lives to some extent in us and with us. From the very beginning, **the character of the man-society relationship changed substantially in accordance with the flow of historical time.** The relationship between the individual and a primitive horde was one thing. Brute force was supreme and instincts were only slightly controlled, although even then there were glimpses of moral standards of cooperation without which any survival, let alone development, would have been impossible. In tribal conditions people were closely bound by ties of blood. At that time there were no state or legal relationships. Not the individual but the tribe, the genus, was the law-giver. The interests of the individual were syncretised with those of the commune. In the horde and in tribal society there were leaders who had come to the fore by their resourcefulness, brains, agility, strength of will, and so on. Labour functions were divided on the basis of age and sex, as were the forms of social and other activity. **With the development of the socium** an ever **increasing differentiation of social functions takes place**. People acquire private personal rights and duties, personal names, and a constantly growing measure of personal responsibility. The individual gradually becomes a personality, and his relations with society acquire an increasingly complex character. When the society based on law and the state first arose, people were sharply divided between masters and slaves, rulers and ruled. Slave society with its private property set people against one another. Some individuals began to oppress and exploit others. Feudal society saw the emergence of the hierarchy of castes, making some people totally dependent on others. On the shoulders of the common toiler there grew up an enormous parasitic tree with kings or tsars at its summit. This pyramid of social existence determined the rights and duties of its citizens, and the rights were nearly all at the top of the social scale. This was a society of genuflection, where not only the toilers but also the rulers bowed the knee to the dogma of Holy Scripture and the image of the Almighty. SK

The individual and society are interdependent. While the society shapes the individual, the individual, with his own autonomic ideas, shapes society. All individual actions are influenced by society. Also, this warrants that society changes over time. Thus, no objective condition of morality exists, as it is constantly changing, unable to guide action. This functions as a disad to the affirmative, as they base the AC off of a static conception of what morality or justice actually is without addressing that which comprises it. Thus, this implicates that we can never derive a static view of morality because it is always changing

Act Two is Fictionalism [0:35]

We cannot base moral truths in absolute claims – rather we should embrace that which lets us develop morality, as we have no way of knowing whether objective statements are actually true.

Joyce,

“The history of moral philosophy can seem a disappointing spectacle. Large tracts of it can be interpreted as **thinkers** taking their own moral preferences and trying desperately to prove them correct. The most ambitious among them **aspire to**objective **absolute**necessary**truth for their** moral **claims.** Failing this (as fail it does), various softer projects are countenanced: Perhaps **objectivity is asking too much**; maybe we can allow that **moral truths are** in some manner **constituted by human practices.** Or perhaps absolutism can be dropped; maybe we can be satisfied with one moral truth forus and another moral truth for them. And so on. **The theories are plentiful**, the convolutions byzantine, the in-fighting bitter, the spilt ink copious, **and the progress** astoundingly **unimpressive.** It is a disappointing spectacle not merely because we have so little to show for it after two and a half thousand years, but because **this enterprise** of self-exoneration can seem immature, as **deriving from an anxious need for reassurance.** Yet when one reflects on where our moral judgments come from, it appears unlikely that this reassurance will be forthcoming. **By the time we take our first tottering steps, each of us is**already **immersed**in a social world rich **in concepts like right and wrong**, desert (relating to rewards and punishments), must and mustn’t. Our **childhood is one grand advertising campaign designed to get us to internalize these concepts**and take them seriously – a campaign, moreover, that in all likelihood we are biologically designed to find compelling, because thinking in this fashion helped our ancestors produce more babies than their competitors. And so we do. **Nowhere** ,however, **does this account** of how we come to make moral judgments **presuppose that any of the beliefs** in question **are actually true** (even approximately so). Now, as adult philosophers – being in a position to stand back and see the process for what it is – **do we really need to concoct** cunning **theories designed to earn this missing truth for our** **moral beliefs?** **Even supposing this mission to establish moral truth were possible** (regarding which the fat back catalog of failed theories cautions pessimism), the motivation to demonstrate that one’s current moral framework – **the product of a particular contingent cultural setting interacting with a particular contingent evolutionary** **trajectory** – **is** more-or-less correct (even if only ‘correct for us’) seems **an expression of** grotesque **hubris.** Even if this felt need for reassurance is natural, investigating why we feel the need seems the braver course than seeking its satisfaction. But what, one might protest, is the alternative? Surely it is not enough simply to make judgments about what is morally right and wrong (virtuous, evil, etc.) and think no further on the matter; surely these judgments require justification. How can I in good faith make the judgment that something is morally wrong if I cannot also maintain that this judgment is true? And if I’m going to maintain that it’s true then I shall need to be confident that there exists some sensible account of those facts in virtue of which it is true. This is not just some abstruse philosophical quandary; this is serious! There is a very real possibility that no reasonable account can be given of what it takes for a moral judgment to be true. Thus there is**a very real possibility that none of our moral judgments are true at all**: it is untrue that punching babies is morally wrong; it is untrue that keeping promises is morally better than breaking them; it is untrue that we have any moral duties towards our fellow humans whatsoever.

Thus, we must always aspire to create an internal view of morality that also coincides with external viewpoints.

Act Three is Fallibilism [0:23]

All human knowledge is fallible – fallibilism is the only way in which we can derive some sort of moral theory and not be skeptics.

Stanley,

David Lewis (1996: 549) writes, concerning the epistemological doctrine of **fallibilism** **[states that]** : **If you claim that S knows that P, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge, of knowledge despite uneliminated possibility of error,** just **sounds contradictory**. Lewis concludes that **fallibilism is** uncomfortable, though **preferable to scepticism**. However, he believes that conte.\'tua|ism about knowledge allows us to 'dodge the choice' between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for 'know' can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism. The challenge facing the non-contextualist advocate of fallibilism is to explain the 0d(.llt\_\' of the kinds of claims Lewis discusses, without embrac- ing contextualism. That is, the challenge is to explain why it seems that speaking of fallible knowledge is odd, without impugning the truth of fallibilism, or adopting contextualism. Following Patrick Rysiew (2001: 493), let us call statements of the form 'S knows that p, but it's possible that q' (where q entails not-pl concessiue knowledge attributions. Here are a few such cases: (1) (a) I know that Harry is a zebra, but it's possible that Harry is a painted mule. (b) john knows that Harry is a zebra, but its possible that Harry is a painted mule. (c) john knows that Harry is a zebra, but it's possible for john that Harry is a painted mule. It should be uncontroversial that, generally, utterances of the sentences in (1) result in infelicity. What I will reject is the additional claim that this fact impuzns fallibilism. SK

This means that all human knowledge is erroneous, and for a statement to not be fallible, there has to be no possibility of that statement being false. That means that the aff has to prove the resolution true in every single case, and one reason that proves the resolution false is sufficient to negate. To clarify, this is not a skep trigger – fallibilism and skep are not the same thing.

Act Four is Pyrrhonism [0:39]

Pyrrhonism is true, meaning that no statement can objectively exist and be true, and there is no way to maintain these beliefs, as they are constantly changing.

Empiricus,

Arcesilaus, however, who we said was the head and founder of the Middle Academy, does indeed seem to me to share the **Pyrrhonean** arguments, so that his Way is almost the same as ours. For one **does not** find him **mak**ing **any assertion about the existence** or nonexistence **of anything**, **nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards credibility or incredibility**; rather, he suspends judgment about everything. And he asserts that the goal is suspension of 233 judgment, **which,** we were saying, **is accompanied by ataraxia**. He further says that **individual cases of suspension are good and that individual cases of assent are bad.** One might note, however, that **while we say these things in accord with what is apparent to us, and we do not firmly maintain them,** he says them as holding in nature, so as to mean that the suspension itself is good and the 234 assent is bad. And if one is to believe what is said about him, be appeared at first glance to be a Pyrrhonean, they say, but in truth be was a Dogmatist; and since be undertook to test his associates by the aporetic method, to see whether they were naturally fitted to receive the Platonic dogmas, he seemed to be aporetic, but in fact he did pass on the Platonic dogmas to those of his \*123\* associates who were naturally fitted. And this was why Ariston said of him: "He is Plato in front, Pyrrho in back, and Diodorus in the middle," for he made use of

All alternatives fail that try and state that some criterion of determining absolute truth is true – we should always try and change our notions of truth and determining truth.

Empiricus 2,

**The** remaining **alternative is to say that of the true**, **some are appearances and some are non-evident**, **but this** possibility, too**, is absurd**. For either all the appearances and the non-evident are true, or some of the appearances and some of the non-evident. Now if all, the statement will once again be turned around, as it will be granted true that nothing is true; and it will be said to be 92 true both that the number of the stars is even and that it is odd. But if only some of the appearances and some of the non-evident are true, how shall we determine that of the appearances these are true and those are false? If by some appearance, **the argument will go on ad infinitum**. And if by something non-evident, then since the non-evident also require determining, by means of what will this non-evident point be determined? **If by some appearance,** **we have the circularity mode, and if by something non-evident, an infinite regress**. 93 Similar things must also be said about the non-evident. For the person who tries to make a determination about them by something non-evident falls into the infinite regress, while the one who tries to do so by an appearance either gets into an infinite regress (if be again and again employs something apparent) or into circularity (if be switches over to something non-evident). **It is false**, therefore**, to say that of the true things some are appearances and some are non-evident.** 94 So **if neither the appearances only nor the non-evident only are true, nor are some of the appearances and some of the non-evident, then nothing is true.** But **if nothing is true, and the criterion is supposed to be useful for making determinations about the true, the criterion is useless and idle even if we grant for the sake of argument that it has some sort of existence.** And if one must suspend judgment as to whether there is anything true, it follows that those who say that dialectic is the science of things false or true or neither are getting ahead of themselves.

Act Five is Creativity [0:42]

The only way to ensure that our ethics can change and develop as according to new views of morality is through Creativity. Creativity arises through spontaneous action in reaction to shifts in circumstances caused by natural forces.

Connolly 13 writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

As individual and collective agents of multiple types, **we exercise one dimension of freedom when we pursue** existing **desires and another when we reflexively reconsider them** and seek outlets to act upon revised desires. But those desires are not merely given in the first instance, and the reflexive process in the second does not always render explicit what was already “implicit” in operative assumptions and desires. There is often more pluripotentiality in the rush of desire forward to consolidation in action than is captured by the lazy idea of the implicit. There is also pluripotentiality during those fecund moments when an entire constituency coalesces under new circumstances, with the change in “circumstances” often shaped by rapid shifts in nonhuman force fields with which they are involved. In such circumstances the creative element of freedom comes into play. To put the point briefly, **neither the tradition of negative freedom nor that of positive freedom comes to terms sufficiently with the role of creativity in freedom**. **Creativity** here **means**, as a first cut, **action by the present upon ambiguities arising from the past oriented toward the future in a way that is not entirely reducible to the past as either implicit in the present or an aggregation of blind causes that produce the future**. It might involve an exploratory movement back and forth between different parties in a cloudy situation that issues in a new result none intended at the start. These initiatives may then be consolidated by disciplinary processes and tactics that help to sediment them into the soft tissues of cultural life. Reflexivity, you might say, begins to do its work after the uncanny, creative element in freedom has begun to unfold, for good or ill. **Creative processes flow through and over us**, and reflexivity doubles the creative adventure. **Actions are thus not entirely controlled by pre-existing intentions; rather the creative dimension helps to compose and refine intentions as they become consolidated in action**. To articulate the creative dimension of freedom, then, is to insert a fundamental qualification or hesitation into the ideas of both the masterful agent and agency as the activation of intentions already there. **The creative element is located somewhere between active and passive agency.** When **creative freedom** is underway in an unsettled context we may find ourselves allowing or **encourag**ing a **new thought, desire, or strategy to crystallize out of the confusion** and nest of proto-thoughts that precede it. An agent, individual or collective, can help to open the portals of creativity, but it cannot will that which is creative to come into being by intending the result before it arrives. **Real creativity is thus tinged with uncertainty and mystery**. **The creative dimension of freedom** discloses an ambiguity that haunts extant ideas of intention, desire, agency, and reflexivity. It **exposes the ambiguity of agency in the practice of freedom**. This ambiguity may find expression, say, in a basketball game as an accomplished player under intense defensive pressure spontaneously fires up the first jump shot ever attempted amid the flow of action. The shot, initially lacking a name, surprises the shooter and mystifies defenders. It was not implicit in the athlete’s repertoire; it emerged in the pressure of action. After being repeated, named, and perfected through relentless training, it may spread like wildfire across the basketball landscape, as that type of shot did in the 1950s in the United States. Everything else in the game now shifts to some degree too. Other players, coaches, and referees now adopt creative responses to it, generating changes in the game through a mélange of partisan mutual adjustments that no individual or organization intended at the outset. Or take a young point guard who spontaneously completes a fast break with a blind, behind-the-back pass and then finds himself negotiating with his coach to decide just when such passes can be allowed in the future. Such modes of **creative**, mutual **adjustment**, neither simply assignable to one player or coach, nor fitting neatly into extant notions of preformed intention, nor reducible to a reflexive dialectic, occur all the time in multiple domains. They **form[s] part of the essence of freedom**. Sk

Thus, creativity can only find expression in communication in some way shape or form, so the only way to actively be creative is through communication. And, creative freedom helps us break free of the ethics of the past and allow us to envision new features of ethics which are key to preserve and adapt the morals of a society, which is their paramount obligation. And, this is the only way to break free of the causal chain of determinism.

Act Six is Discourse [0:43]

All ethical and political norms, regardless of the actor, are based on the interaction between individuals.

Habermas explains, [The inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. Jürgen Habermas. [MIT Press](http://mitpress.mit.edu/), 1998, parts VIII and IX of Chapter 1]

I proceed on the assumption that the **participants** do not **wish to resolve** their **conflicts through** violence, or even compromise, but through **communication**. Thus their initial impulse is to **[They] engage in deliberation** and **[to] work out a shared *ethical*self-understanding** on a secular basis. But given the differentiated forms of life characteristic of pluralistic societies, such an effort is doomed to failure. The participants will soon realize that **the critical appropriation of their strong evaluations leads to competing conceptions of the good.** Let us assume that they nevertheless remain resolved to engage in deliberation and not to fall back on a mere *modus vivendi* as a substitute for the threatened moral way of life. **In the absence of** a **substantive agreement** on particular norms, **the participants must** now rely on the “neutral” fact that each of them **participate**s **in *some*communicative form of life** which is structured by linguistically mediated understanding. Since **communicative processes** and forms of life have certain structural features in common, they could ask themselves whether these features **harbor normative contents that** could **provide a basis for shared orientations**. Taking this as a clue, theories in the tradition of Hegel, Humboldt, and G. H. Mead have shown that **communicative actions** involve shared presuppositions and that communicative forms of life **are interwoven with relations of reciprocal recognition**, and to this extent, both **[and] have a normative content**. These analyses demonstrate that **morality derives** a genuine **meaning**, independent of the various conceptions of the good, **from** the form and perspectival structure of unimpaired, intersubjective **socialization.**

All moral norms must arise from the communication between individuals since the only way a norm would work is if individuals interact and talk about them. The NC framework is a prerequisite because the affirmative framework garners meaning through communication. Argumentation itself presumes the necessity of communication.

Habermas 2 explains,

This is easy to understand in an intuitive way (though any attempt to provide a formal justification would require involved discussions of the meaning and feasibility of “transcendental arguments”). Here I will limit myself to the observation that **we engage in argumentation with the intention of convincing one another of the validity claims** that proponents raise for their statements and are ready to defend against opponents. The practice of **argumentation sets in motion a cooperativecompetition for the better argument**, where the orientation to the goal of a communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the outset. The assumption that the competition can lead to “rationally acceptable,” hence “convincing,” results is based on the rational force of arguments. Of course, what counts as a good or a bad argument can itself become a topic for discussion. Thus **the rational acceptability of a statement ultimately rests on reasons in conjunction with specific features of the process of argumentation itself.** The four most important features are: **(i)** that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; **(ii)** that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; **(iii)** that the participants must mean what they say; and **(iv)** that communication must be freed from external and internal coercion so that the “yes” or “no” stances that participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons. If everyone who engages in argumentation must make at least these pragmatic presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and the inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only reasons that give equal weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody can influence the outcome of practical discourses; and because of the absence of (iii) deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favor of the acceptance of a controversial norm. Finally, on the assumption that participants reciprocally impute an orientation to communicative agreement to one another, this “uncoerced” acceptance can only occur “jointly” or collectively. Against the frequently raised objection that this justification is circular I would note that **the content of the universal presuppositions of argumentation is by no means “normative” in the moral sense.** For inclusivity only signifies that access to discourse is unrestricted; it does not imply the universality of binding norms of action. The equal distribution of **communicative freedoms** and the requirement of truthfulness **in discourse have the status of argumentativeduties** and rights, not of moralduties and rights. So too, the absence of coercion refers to the process of argumentation itself, not to interpersonal relations outsideof this practice. These constitutive rules of the language game of argumentation govern the exchange of arguments and of “yes” or “no” responses; they have the epistemic force of enabling conditions for the justification of statements but do not have any immediatepractical effects in motivating actions and interactions outside of discourse. The point of such a justification of the moral point of view is that **the normative content of** this **epistemic language** game **is transmitted only by** a rule of argumentation to the selection of norms of action, which together with their moral validity claim provide the input into practical **discourses**. A moral obligation cannot follow from the so to speak transcendental constraint of unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation alone; rather it attaches to the specific objects of practical discourse, namely, to the norms introducedinto discourse to which the reasons mobilized in deliberation refer. I emphasize this when I specify that (U) can be rendered plausible in connection with a(weak, hence nonprejudicial) concept of normative justification.

Thus, the only way to maintain communication is through discourse in round, meaning that it precludes the AC as the ac can (1) make their arguments only through discourse and (2) the ideas presented in the AC can only be accessed through the ability for those in society to maintain discourse. This does not conflate the pre fiat and post fiat layer and take away the distinction – the judge evaluates the arguments made through the lens of the framework that is provided in round; when a judge votes off of util, he votes for the debater who he thinks will maximize utility through the case; similarly, when a judge presupposes discourse, he votes for the arguments that preserve discourse.

[Contention]

Underview [0:55]

**First,** Presume neg in the absence of offense and in any case when offense becomes invalid because to negate means to deny and there are infinitely many more ways to deny a statement than there is to prove its truth. Prefer definitional arguments because: **a.** Grammar is the basis of the expression of language and thus argumentation, which makes it a pre-requisite. **b**. There is a reason why the burden of the proof is on the aff – things are always more likely false than true because there are an infinite number of ways to deny something. **c.** Definitions hold the internal link to predictability because understanding our language is based in definitions. Predictability outweighs on fairness because it forms the basis of prep, i.e., I determine a neg strat based on definitions. And, skepticism negates. **(1)** skepticism renders the resolution and the affirmative framing of the resolution impossible, meaning that we must negate, as the resolutional question is absurd. **(2)** If this is not true, however, *then* skep triggers presumption, as it renders all aff offense in the round absurd. The aff must respond to all of these if they want to trigger skepticism. **Second**, All aff interps must be clarified in C/X to avoid time-consuming theory debates to set norms where we can set norms in C/X itself. **Third,** aff must respond to negative framework and contention instead of introducing a new layer in the 1AR, and if they do, they must line by line the arguments instead of running generic dumps as this is key to philosophical education – neither side learns from the debate if both sides are just reading off of backfiles or introduce new layers to avoid the phil debate. **Fourth,** any theory about what constitutes a legitimate neg advocacy must be in the 1AC, as this is the only way to preemptively solve back A. strat skew – I cannot formulate a new strategy in the 2N if aff reads new theory in the 1A constraining my strategy – this allows me to formulate a strategy that is net beneficial to the affirmative and the negative in the 1N. B. Clash. If the interp is in the 1AC I get a chance to meet it so we can have a real substantive debate. Key to education—ensures we’re learning about the topic. C. Resolvability. Even if I don’t want to conform to your interp, three speech theory debates ensure the round is irresolvable because 1. There’s no 3nr for the neg to respond to new 2AR responses and weighing and 2. Blippy theory debates encourage judge intervention, both of which kill fairness.

Extensions

Spirkin Extension [0:17]

Extend **Spirkin**, who says that all morals and ethics are relativistic because humans develop notions of ethics themselves in relation to their societal influences. This has two implications. Either (a) every individual has a different conception of morality meaning that we negate because the affirmative garners meaning through there being one conception of morality under which they frame their arguments or (b) the whole conception of morality is always changing as society and people are constantly changing, meaning that we negate because the affirmative has a static conception of morality that has to be maintained, rather than changing it in accordance with the flow of time.

Joyce Extension

Stanley Extension

Empiricus Extension

Connoly Extension [0:30]

Determinism Trigger [0:15]

Defense on creativity triggers determinism. Extend Connoly, who explains that creativity is the only way to break free of the causal chain that binds us to determinism, as it allows for spontaneous action that reacts to shifts in natural circumstances, allowing us to break the causal connection to an event from the past. However, if creativity is false, then determinism is true, meaning that *you just activated my trap card* – determinism means that no free will exists meaning that the actors in the aff world cannot take any action and you negate on face.

Regular Extension [0:15]

Extend Connoly, who explains how any action taken, to be constituted as an action, must be creative in itself, as an action is a representation of free will. One can only have free will if they break free of the causal chain of events that makes their will subject to external forces, which means that the only way to have free will is through creativity as creativity is a difference from this causal chain by definition and by purpose – creativity breaks from the natural flow of things. As such, creativity is the only way to have any movement constituted as action, and thus it precludes the AC framework.

Habermas Extension

Frontlines

AT: Skep Bad \*\*Theory\*\*

**A.** C/I: On the [year] [month] Topic the negative debater may have skepticism triggers present in the AC/NC if they all contain the word skepticism *or* are clarified in CX.

**B.** I Meet

**C.** Standards

(1) Skepticism Education. The only way to conceive in other notions of philosophy is through learning about skepticism. Only by getting deep insight into it can we conquer it and thus remove it from entering our sphere of thought. The NC provides this insight by showing how different things can lead to skepticism, and thus provides us the ability to gain knowledge. This is also key to **Topical Education** as the only way in which we can learn about the topic is if we get insight into skepticism in and of itself. This allows us to engage in topical debates in the future.

Ludwig, [Stein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Currents of the Present Day*. Vol. 1. 1918. Reprint. London: Forgotten Books, 2013. 90-1. Print. SK]

an ideal which is always to be striven for but never to be attained. As according to the Jesuit's maxim, the end should sanctify the means, so in pragmatism the end justifies knowledge and the means to it, namely, our present instru ments of thought or categories with their imperfect capacity for truth. Against the relativising of all present knowledge but absolutising of all knowledge in the distant future, the following considerations which flow from within must be advanced. If the criterion of present knowledge be its use fulness and effectiveness, with what justice does James discard scepticism (The Philos. Review. Jan 1908, p. 9)? Against strong superstitions and deeply-rooted prejudices **scepticism has proved itself one of the most powerful instruments for deepening our insight into the working of nature.** **All dogmatism works by** producing sleep, by **paralysing scientific certainty and checking the progress towards absolute truth which indeed should be our distant ideal**. **The relativist** James **has not only no right to disown** haughtily his relationship with **scepticism,** **but** on the contrary, **it is his duty to make it his companion in arms, so far as it rejects the old, the passe and the unstable**. Where scepticism is negative, there pragmatism has to follow it. Only where it acts depressingly, as in its doctrine of ^oxn, in its logical asceticism, and only there, ought pragmatism to break off its alliance with it. In his work Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophic und seine Vberwindung (Scepticism in philosophy and its refutation) R,aoul Eichter says most appositely, " **Deep insight into the nature of scepticism results in its conquest. Only in this way will it be possible to associate " cheerful philosophy and even cheerful metaphysics with a pure, intellectual conscience."** SK

This also means skep education is key to **ground** as the only ground an affirmative or negative debater has will be tainted by skepticism unless if we delve into learning about it through skeptic knowledge and response to what notions must constantly be questioned, and **strategy** as we cannot develop a cogent strategy without first confronting and beating back skepticism through learning about it by making it our companion in philosophical debate.

D. The voter is for philosophical education

AT: Skep Bad \*\*Substance\*\*

AT: Creativity Bad

AT: R/T Habermas

AT: Pre/Post Theory

1. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/ch05-s04.html [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. William Connolly (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University). The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Duke University Press. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)